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IN RE BEINEKE
690 F.3D 1344 (FED. CIR. 2012)
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Beineke, Walter Beineke, a patent applicant, appealed
the rejection of his two patent applications regarding two species
of white oak trees, by the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (the "Board").' Beineke alleged that the patent
applications should be granted pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 161
because the oak trees were found on a cultivated lawn.2 Section
161 provides patent protection for inter alia plants discovered on
cultivated land.' After examining the history of the statute, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Board's decision to reject both patent applications, concluding that
patent protection is extended to mature plants only when human
activity is involved in the plant's invention or discovery.'
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
In late 1981, Walter Beineke came across two white oak trees in
the front yard of someone's home.' Beineke noticed that both oak
trees, referred to as AFTO-2 and AFTO-3 in the patent
applications, had shown "superior genetic traits as compared to
1. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d 1344, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
2. Id. at 1346.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).
4. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1354.
5. Id. at 1346. The fact that Beineke found the two species of oak trees on
someone else's property does not affect the outcome of the decision. The patent
statute only requires that a person invents or discovers a new variety of plant,
but does not mandate that the new variety must be located on the property of the
inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 161.
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other white oak trees."6 The superior traits that the two trees
exhibited included distinct timber quality and central stem
tendency.! Beineke observed that AFTO-2 was about 118 years
old, that AFTO-3 was about 105 years old, and that both were
about 65 feet in height.' Beineke then decided to take acorns from
each of the superior oak trees and plant them, in order to ascertain
whether the progeny trees would carry the same superior genetic
traits.9 After a few years of observation, Beineke concluded that
the superior genetic traits were carried by the progeny trees.o
Beineke then asexually reproduced the progeny trees and found
that the superior genetic traits "ran true to the originally discovered
trees and to each other in all respects."" After examination,
Beineke believed that he had discovered "two new and distinct
varieties" of oak trees. 12
B. Procedural History
Having believed that he discovered two new varieties of oak
trees, Beineke filed plant patent applications for AFTO-2 and
AFTO-3, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 161." Though Beineke argued
that he found the oak trees on a groomed lawn, the examiner
denied both patent applications because the trees were not found in
a cultivated state, as the statute requires.14 After concluding that
6. Id. at 1348.
7. Id. at 1346.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1346.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. In order to obtain a plant patent, there needs to be an invention or a
discovery; "it is not enough that a thing shall be new, in the sense that in the
shape or form in which it is produced shall not have been before known, and
that it shall be useful, but it must, under the constitution and the statute, amount
to an invention or discovery." Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11 (1885).
The invention or discovery must involve "an exercise of the inventive faculty."
Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225 (1976).
14. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1346.
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Beineke lacked sufficient evidence of cultivation, the examiner
issued the final rejections of both the patent applications."
Beineke then appealed both final rejections to the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (the "Board"). 6 The Board
examined the legislative history of § 161 and concluded
"compliance with the 'cultivated' requirement of § 161 is
determined by whether the existence or condition of the found
plant itself has been affected by human activity (i.e.,
cultivation)."" The Board found that the land on which the trees
existed was wooded, uncultivated pasture owned by the
Government up until 1930.8 In 1930, a house was constructed on
the property and the land became privately owned." However, the
Board found that the oak trees began growing well before the
construction of the house.2 0 The Board majority also found that
Beineke offered no evidence of human activity contributing to the
cultivation of the trees.2' Because the trees began growing in an
uncultivated state and no human activity contributed to the growth
15. Id.
16. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1346 (citing Ex Parte Walter F. Beineke, No.
2007-3882, 2008 WL 2942147, *1 (B.P.A.I. July 30, 2008); Ex Parte Walter F.
Beineke, No. 2007-4215, 2008 WL 2951696, *1 (B.P.A.I. July 31, 2008)).
17. Id. (citing Beineke, 2008 WL 2942147 at *4; Beineke, 2008 WL
2951696 at *4). The Board went on to reason that the cultivation requirement
applies to a cultivated "state" not a cultivated "area." Beineke, 2008 WL
2942147 at *4; Beineke, 2008 WL 2951696 at *4. Therefore, simply because
the mature oak trees were found on a cultivated lawn does not mean that the oak
tree itself was invented or discovered in a cultivated state. Beineke, 2008 WL
2942147 at *4; Beineke, 2008 WL 2951696 at *4.
18. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1346.
19. Id. (citing Beineke, 2008 WL 2942147 at *1; Beineke, 2008 WL
2951696 at *1).
20. Id. (citing Beineke, 2008 WL 2942147 at *3; Beineke, 2008 WL
2951696 at *3). The Board found that AFTO-2 was 118 years old and began
growing in 1879 and that AFTO-3 was 105 years old and began growing in
1889. Beineke, 2008 WL 2942147 at *2 (discussing AFTO-3); Beineke, 2008
WL 2951696 at *2 (discussing AFTO-2). Thus, both trees began growing
before 1930 when the house was built, which transformed the wooded land into
a cultivated area. Beineke, 2008 WL 2942147 at *3; Beineke, 2008 WL
2951696 at *3.
21. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1346 (citing Beineke, 2008 WL 2942147 at
*7; Beineke, 2008 WL 2951696 at *7).
2013] 513
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of the trees, the Board concluded the trees did not meet the
requirements of § 161.22
After the Board's rejection, Beineke filed a request for
continued examination and argued that the oak trees were
discovered in a cultivated state because the lawn surrounding the
trees was cultivated.2 3 After the examiner again rejected the patent
applications, Beineke appealed to an enlarged Board.24
The enlarged Board also rejected the two patent applications.2 5
The Board supported their conclusion by determining that it was
unlikely that the trees were planted by a human and that there was
insufficient evidence of cultivation.26
One Board member concurred in the decision, arguing a
narrower reading of § 161, and another Board member dissented,
arguing that the trees were patentable because they were found on
a "place of residence." 27  Beineke then appealed both Board
decisions, rejecting the two applications, to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.28  The Federal Circuit
consolidated the appeals.29
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
addressed the Board's rejection of Beineke's patent applications
by analyzing the legislative history of 35 US.C. § 161.30 The
Federal Circuit addressed two main issues while interpreting the
22. Id. (citing Beineke, 2008 WL 2942147 at *3 Appeal 2007-3882; Beineke,
2008 WL 2951696 at *3). Two members of the Board dissented from the
rejection, concluding that the two oak trees were patentable because the board
members believed "cultivated" to mean that the plant only needed to receive
human labor after its discovery. Id. Therefore, even though no human activity
was involved in the growth of the oak trees, Beineke contributed to the trees
after he discovered them. Id. (citing Beineke, 2008 WL 2942147 at * 13).
23. Id. at 1346-47.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1347.
26. Id.
27. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1347.
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id
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statute: (1) whether the trees were patentable under the original
1930 Plant Patent Act and (2) whether the trees were patentable
under the 1954 Amendments to the Plant Patent Act." The
Federal Circuit reviewed these issues of statutory construction de
novo. 32
A. The 1930 Plant Patent Act
The Federal Circuit held that the two mature oak trees did not
fall under the protection of the 1930 Plant Patent Act (1930 Act).33
The 1930 Act provisions, which were incorporated into the present
statute, required that the plant was a result of human activity and
that the true inventor was the one to apply for the patent." In
analyzing these two elements, the Federal Circuit looked at both
the contemporary legal context and the legislative history of the
1930 Act.
1. Contemporary Legal Context
Prior to 1930, the general attitude towards plant patents was that
plants were products of nature and, thus, could not be patented.6
The 1930 Act was promulgated in order to change this attitude and
to allow plants to be patented under a limited context." The 1930
Act extended patent protection to:
31. Id. at 1348.
32. Id. at 1347. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has the authority to review the Board's decisions on appeal. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(4)(A) (2006). The Federal Circuit reviews the Board's legal
conclusions about statutory construction without any deference to the Board's
decision. In re Giacomini, 612 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
33. In reBeineke, 690 F.3d at 1352.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1348,1350.
36. Id. at 1349. The Supreme Court in Chakrabarty recognized that prior to
1930 there was a long held "belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were
products of nature for purposes of the patent law." Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 311 (1980).
37. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1350.
2013] 515
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Any person who has invented or discovered any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvements thereof, or who has invented or
discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct
and new variety of plant, other than a tuber-
propagated plant,... may... obtain a patent
therefor."
Importantly, the 1930 Act excluded the extension of patent
protection to the mere finding of new plants."
2. Legislative History
The Federal Circuit then analyzed the legislative history of the
1930 Act and found that the legislative history also emphasized the
requirement that human creative effort was a necessary component
to acquire a plant patent.40 The Senate Report for the 1930 Act
illustrated that Congress specifically rejected proposed provisions
that would extend patent protection to the finding of new plants.4'
The intention of Congress was clear that the 1930 Act only
provided patent protection for the discovery or invention of new
varieties of plants that included the inventive faculty of the
inventor.42
38. Id. at 1348, n.2 (citing Act of May 23, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-245, ch.
312, 46 Stat. 376). According to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, a
tuber-propagated plant is a "short, thickened portion of an underground
branch .... This exception is made because this group alone, among asexually
reproduced plants, is propa-gated by the same party of the plant that is sold as
food." MPEP § 1601 (8th Ed., Rev. 1, Aug. 2001).
39. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1349.
40. Id at 1351.
41. Id
42. Id at 1351-52. The Senate report compared the invention of a new plant
to a mineral substance:
[t]here is a clear and logical distinction between the discovery
of a new variety of plant and of certain inanimate things, such,
for example, as a new and useful natural mineral. The mineral
is created wholly by nature unassisted by man and is likely to
be discovered in various parts of the country; and, being the
516
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The contemporary legal context and the legislative history of the
1930 Act both demonstrated that the 1930 Act required human
activity involved in the invention or discovery of the plant as well
as the patent being submitted by the true inventor.4 3 These
histories illustrated that merely finding a new plant without the
involvement of human activity in the planting or growth would not
be extended patent protection under the 1930 Act.44 Based on the
foregoing, the Federal Circuit held that the two oak trees did not
fall under the protection of the 1930 Act.4 5 The court reasoned that
Beineke did not allege that the trees were a product of his creative
efforts.46 Beineke instead interpreted the statute to allow patent
protection for a mere finding of a new variety of plant, without any
human intervention.7
B. The 1954 Amendments
The Federal Circuit held that the two mature oak trees also did
not fall under the protection of the 1954 Amendments to the plant
patent statutes. 48  The amendments provide that there is an
exception to the rule that plants merely found in nature were not
patentable.4 9 Section 161 was amended to state:
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually
reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant,
property of all those on whose land it may be found, its free
use by the respective owners should of course be permitted.
On the other hand, a plant discovery resulting from cultivation
is unique, isolated, and is not repeated by nature, nor can it be
reproduced by nature unaided by manFalse It is obvious that
nature originally creates plants but it can not be denied that
man often controls and directs the natural processes and
produces a desired result.
Id. at 1352 (citing S. Rep. No. 71-315, at 6-7; H.R. Rep. No. 71-1129, at 7).
43. Id.
44. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1352.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1347.
48. Id.
49. Id.
2013] 517
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including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and
newly found seedlings, other than a tuber
propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated
state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title. 0
Within the amendment is an exception for seedlings newly
found in a cultivated state.51  The Federal Circuit found that the
cultivated land aspect of this exception was important because it
illustrated that the requirement of human activity still existed. 2
Cultivation would tend to indicate that human participation
contributed to the seedling's inception." Therefore, this exception
promulgated by the 1954 Amendments accords with the
requirement that the plant's discovery or invention be a result of
human activity and the creative faculty.54 Hence, Congress
affirmed the notion that plants that were merely discovered
without human activity were not patentable under the statute.
Beineke interpreted the present statute, which incorporated the
1954 Amendment provisions, to extend patent protection to the
mature oak trees because they were discovered on cultivated
land.56 However, the amendments only created the exception for
newly found seedlings, not any other type of plant.5 ' Thus,
because Beineke conceded that the two mature oak trees were not
newly found seedlings, the Federal Circuit found that the trees did
not fall under the protection of the 1954 Amendments.
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that, because the oak trees
did not fall under the protection of either the 1930 Act or the 1954
Amendments, the Board's rejection of Beineke's patent
applications should be affirmed.59
50. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (emphasis added).
51. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1353.
52. Id
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1352.
57. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1352.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1354.
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IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Federal Circuit's decision in In re Beineke to retain the
narrow scope of 35 U.S.C. § 161 has a significant impact on
subject matter that is patentable. One modem debate surrounding
patentability of plants includes whether plants can be patented
under both § 161 as well as § 101 of the patent statute. 60 Recently,
courts have upheld that plants can be patented under a utility
patent pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101.61 With the ability of an
inventor to resort to the broad interpretation of § 101, the Federal
Circuit's decision properly retained a narrow interpretation of §
161.
The patentable subject matter under § 101 includes inventions or
discoveries of "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof..." 6 2 While courts usually look to § 101 for guidance on
patentable subject matter, such guidance exists in other sections of
the patent statute as well. To obtain a plant patent, the patentable
subject matter, examined in In re Beineke, is defined by the more
stringent requirements of § 16 1.63 Lately, courts have been
struggling with the issue of providing a meaningful standard for
patentable subject matter that does not exclude uncontemplated
future innovations that do not fall neatly within that standard.64
Difficulty arises when attempting to apply the different subject
matter sections in a way that does not encompass ineligible subject
60. See, e.g., Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560,
1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995); J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc.,
534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001); Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1013-14
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
61. Imazio Nursery, 69 F.3d at 1563-64 (focusing on the fact that § 161
"engrafts the Plant Patent Act onto the basic patent law, which requires us to
apply thereto all the rules, regulations, and provisions of the basic patent law,
except as otherwise provided"); J.E.M Agric. Supply, 534 U.S. at 143 (finding
that there is nothing explicit in either § 161 or § 101 that prevents plants from
being patented under § 101); David, 516 F.3d at 1014 (upholding the broad
reach of § 101, thus declining to narrow the scope of patentable subject matter).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
63. Id. § 161.
64. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1301-02 (2012).
2013] 519
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matter, while also not foreclosing the possibility of adding new
subject matter in the future.6 5 This struggle has emerged at the
forefront of § 101, and given the overlapping nature of plant patent
protection, this struggle will continue to have implications on
patentability under § 16 1.66
Courts have held that plants are not only patentable under § 161,
but also under utility patents pursuant to § 101.67 In 1985, the
Board held that plants were within the subject matter of § 101
because plants are within the meaning of "manufacture" or
"composition matter."6 1 Since that decision, courts have
continuously upheld the notion that plants are patentable under §
101, as well as § 161.69 Other decisions have elaborated on this
notion and held that neither the 1930 Act nor the 1954
Amendments are the exclusive means for plant patents and thus do
not preclude plants from being patented under § 101.70
Similar to the issue of plant patentability in In re Beineke, the
issue of gene patentability under § 101 also concerns the question
of human intervention." In Association for Molecular Pathology,
the Federal Circuit had to determine whether two isolated human
65. Id. at 1301.
66. See J.E.M Agric. Supply, 534 U.S. at 135. In JE.M Agric. Supply,
petitioners argued that plants were not proper subject matter under § 101
because if they were, then Congress would have never enacted the Plant Patent
Act. Id. at 134. In response, the Supreme Court held that denying such
protection under § 101 "would be inconsistent with the forward-looking
perspective of the utility patent statute." Id. at 135.
67. See Imazio Nursery, 69 F.3d at 1563-64; J.E.M Agric. Supply, 534 U.S.
at 143; David, 516 F.3d at 1014.
68. J.E.M Agric. Supply, 534 U.S. at 131. In Ex Parte Hibberd, the Board
held that plants were included in the patentable subject matter of § 101 because
plants were within the understood meaning of "manufacture" or "composition
matter." Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, at 444 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 1985).
69. See Imazio Nursery, 69 F.3d at 1563-64; J.E.M Agric. Supply, 534 U.S.
at 143; David, 516 F.3d at 1014.
70. JE.M Agric. Supply, 534 U.S. at 137-38 (ruling that the defendant's use
of negative inferences do not support the notion that there are not any "express
indication that Congress intended § 161 to be the exclusive means of patenting
plants").
71. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
689 F.3d 1303, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
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genes, BRCAI and BRCA2, were considered either products of
nature or human-made inventions.72 The Federal Circuit held that
the isolated DNA molecules were not found in nature, but were
"obtained in the laboratory and are man-made, the product of
human ingenuity. While they are prepared from products of nature,
so is every other composition of matter."" The Federal Circuit
elaborated on the patentability of the molecules and stated that the
claims "cover molecules that are markedly different-have a
distinctive chemical structure and identity-from those found in
nature."7 4 Similar to the analysis and holding in In re Beineke, it is
clear that a patent will not be issued for something that was merely
found in nature, without any intervention by the human faculty."
As seen in both In re Beineke and Association for Molecular
Pathology, the distinction between ineligible products of nature
and inventions with the requisite level of human intervention will
continue to be a hotly debated issue.
Courts have a desire for efficient application of § 101, but are
reluctant to create too specific of a guideline in applying the law.76
This specificity could potentially preclude desirable future
applications of the statute and create a concern that "patent law not
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of
laws of nature." On the other hand, courts are also concerned
with making too broad of a guideline for patentable subject
matter." The Supreme Court has cautioned that too broad of an
application of § 101 "could eviscerate patent law" and open the
floodgates of litigation, eventually dulling the overall effectiveness
of the statute.79
72. Id at 1325.
7 3. Id.
74. Id. at 1328.
75. See id at 1325.
76. See Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1301; JE.M Agric. Supply, 534
U.S. at 130.
77. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1301.
78. Id. at 1293.
79. Id (recognizing that "too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary
principle could eviscerate patent law"). While courts are encouraged to broadly
interpret § 101, too broad of interpretation, especially as applied to living things,
would start to cross the line into the unpatentable areas of nature, physical
2013] 52 1
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As related to In re Beineke, plants were once believed to be
unpatentable subject matter because they were considered products
of nature."0 Now, the legislature and courts recognize that plants
can be patented under both § 161 and § 101,, but courts still need
to be cautious of foreclosing the possibilities of patentable subject
matter by narrowly applying these sections."' A narrow
interpretation might create a hindrance to the addition of
patentable subject matter in the future. However, retaining a
narrow application of § 161, like the Federal Circuit did in In re
Beineke, might not be such a hindrance because of the
exceptionally broad language of § 101.82 Courts will continue to
recognize, based on decisions such as In re Beineke, that a narrow
application of § 161 is proper, so long as courts retain the
expansive language of § 10 1. "
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit ultimately rejected both of Beineke's plant
patent applications.84 The court decided to retain the narrow scope
of § 161 by not allowing patent-eligibility based on a mere finding
of a new variety of mature white oak trees." Moreover, the
phenomena, and abstract ideas. See MPEP § 2105 (8th Ed., Rev. 1, Aug. 2001).
Too broad of an interpretation of § 101 would invite a dramatic influx of new
patent applications, as well as Board and court decisions analyzing those
applications, which would inevitably clog up both the court system and the PTO
Board process.
80. See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309.
81. See 35 U.S.C. § 161.
82. In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1354. See J.E.M. Agric. Supply, 534 U.S. at
130 (noting that the "language of § 101 is extremely broad").
83. J.E.M Agric. Supply, 534 U.S. at 138 (holding that defendant's negative
inferences "simply does not support carving out subject matter that otherwise
fits comfortably within the expansive language of § 101 . . . ."). Though courts
may look to In re Beineke as guidance for the narrow application of § 161, the
decision would most likely not have come out differently if Beineke applied for
a utility patent under § 101. The subject matter that Beineke was trying to
patent was something merely found in nature and thus ineligible for any patent.
See In re Beineke, 690 F.3d at 1346.
84. In reBeineke, 690 F.3d at 1354.
85. Id.
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Federal Circuit maintained that an element of cultivation is
required by the patent statute and that this element is not so easily
overcome.8 6 In clearly defining the scope of § 161, the court
refined the notion of plant patentability and, at the same time,
reinforced the effective guidance found in the statute."
Melissa S. Reeks*
86. See id. at 1352.
87. See id. at 1354.
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